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THE WAITANGI TRIBUNAL AND THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION; 
CONTRASTING MECHANISMS FOR THE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS 
AND THEIR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
New Zealand as a nation has over the last fifteen years been forced to 
finally grapple with various political and legal issues relating to 
its indigenous people, the Maori. These issues have arisen as a 
re sult of the Maori people's growing awareness of the failure by the 
Crown to maintain its obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi of 6 
February 1840. Their grievances take diverse forms and it is only 
recently that the general public has become aware of the wider 
ramifications of legal and political acknowledgement of the legitimacy 
of these claims. 
Overseas and in particular Canada and the United States such issues 
have been handled by central government via various agencies and 
procedures for many years. This paper attempts to examine two devices 
established to handle what are relati vely new responsibilities for 
central government, more so in New Zealand 
Our own Waitangi Tribunal has been fun ctioning since 1975, although 
only since 1982 in any significant capacity. In that time a unique 
institution has evolved to manage these multifaceted disputes between 
the Government and its native people. In the United States a federal 
agency was created in 1946 called the Indian Claims Commission. Its 
function and purpose was not dissimilar to that of the Wai t angi 
Tribunal, namely to resol ve longstanding grievances held by the native 
American Indian arising out of breached treaties, and negligent or 
dishonourable federal administration. This paper studies the two 
distinct bodies by means of their development, mechanics, approach and 
performance in an attempt to analyse whether such institutions can 
effectively resolve such disputes or at least whether such bodies have 
a positive role to play in their settlement. 
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THE WAITANGI TRIBUNAL 
Introduction 
In October 1975 the Labour Government passed the Treaty of Waitangi 
Act 1975. The legislation was a political response to increasing 
pressure from Maori for greater recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi 
and their grievances arising from its non- implementation. 1 
The Long Title and Preamble to the Act provides as follows: 
"An Act to provide for the observance, and confirmation, of the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi by establishing a Tribunal 
to make recommendations on claims relating to the practical 
application of the Treaty and to determine whether certain 
matters are inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty. 
WHEREAS on the 6th day of February 1840 a Treaty was entered into 
at Waitangi between Her late Majesty Queen Victoria and the Maori 
people of New Zealand; And whereas the text of the Treaty in the 
English language differs from the text of the Treaty in the Maori 
language; And whereas it is desirable that a Tribunal be 
established to make recommendations on claims relatin to the 
ractical a lication of the rinci les of the Treat and for 
that purpose, to determine its meaning and effect and whether 
certain matters are inconsistent with those principles." 
The Minister of Maori Affairs, Mr M. Rata commented on the Bill's 
introduction to the House on 8 November 1974. 2 
The Bill arises from the Government's election undertaking on the 
Treaty of Waitangi, which was ... to examine the practical 
means of legally acknowledging the principles set out in the 
Treaty. 
The Minister further commented "I have some personal reservations in 
that the provisions are not retrospective". 3 This was a reference to 
the limitation placed on the jurisdiction of the Tribunal preventing 
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it from investigating historic grievances ar1s1ng prior to the 
enactment of the legislation. Accordingly, the Tribunal was not 
initially established as a formal dispute resolution device designed 
to finally resolve various Maori Treaty injustices. It was 
commissioned to investigate Maori grievances under the Treaty and to 
review Crown policy, practice and legislation, and make 
recommendations thereon but only as such matters arose post 1975. 
In 1985 its powers of review were greatly extended back to 1840. 
Notwithstanding that large extension of jurisdiction the Tribunal's 
brief as contained in the terms of the original Act remained 
unchanged; yet the Tribunal within the last six years has undergone a 
startling metamorphosis. Its decisions on varied Treaty topics have 
had wide and significant legal and political impact. From what was 
first perceived as another quasi - political administrative body the 
Tribunal has emerged as an influential forum. 
As the emphasis of today's Treaty issues move away from questions of 
whether legitimate historic grievances exist to ones of practical 
redress it may be that the Tribunal either within its existing terms 
of reference or as a result of some extension to its present powers 
best offers the appropriate procedure to provide working solutions. 
Currently participants in the debate advocate either legal or 
political process as the means of achieving long term settlement. The 
Tribunal may well provide an appropriate compromise. 
Membership and Evolution of the Waitangi Tribunal 
The Tribunal as originally constituted consisted of: -
The Chief Judge of the Maori Land Court (who was to be the 
Chairman) 
One person appointed by the Governor- General on the 
recommendation of the Minister of Justice 
One person being a Maori, to be appointed by the Governor- General 
on the recommendation of the Minister of Maori Affairs.
4 
In 1985 the constitution of the Tribunal changed. The Chief Judge of 
the Maori Land Court remained the Chairman, however, the Tribunal's 
4 
membership was enlarged to six of whom at least four were to be Maori, 
to be appointed by the Governor- General on the recommendation of the 
Minister of Maori Affairs after consultation with the Minister of 
Justice. 5 
In 1988 the Act was amended again to increase the membership of the 
Tribunal to the Chairman and 16 members. The amendment also abandoned 
any racial qualification. 6 At the time of the amendment the Tribunal 
had some 150 cases before it. It was patently clear that the Tribunal 
was not able to cope with this huge caseload. Presently the Tribunal 
is able to sit in divisions with a minimum of three members and a 
maximum of seven in each division. It is hoped that with the Tribunal 
sitting in this manner it will be able to act simultaneously and 
perhaps clear the backlog in about 15 years. 
In any analysis of decision making bodies, examination of the 
personnel who make up the entity is perhaps not considered an 
appropriate means of gauging that body's performance. Yet in the case 
of the Waitangi Tribunal, it cannot be ignored that the personalities 
who have been appointed as members of the Tribunal have to a large 
degree and perhaps not surprisingly had a considerable affect on the 
effectiveness of the Tribunal. Since the appointment of Chief Judge 
Durie as Chief Judge of the Maori Land Court and hence as Chairman of 
the Tribunal in 1982, the Tribunal has become a more vigorous and 
active institution. This change occurred prior to the extension of 
the Tribunal's jurisdiction in 1985. 
It is notable that before the first members of the Tribunal could be 
appointed under the 1975 Act passed by the Labour Government there was 
a general election. The National Opposition who had been less than 
enthusiastic towards the Treaty Bill become the Government. Despite 
being critical of the Bill while in Opposition, the National 
Government appointed the first members in late 1976. 
The Tribunal's inauspicious beginnings have been perhaps best 
illustrated by a number of commentators in their description of its 
first sitting on 30 May 1977 in the ballroom of the Hotel 
Intercontinental in Auckland. Mr Joseph Hawke and others of the Ngati 
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Whatua tribe of Orakei brought a claim in relation to fishing rights 
in the Waitemata Harbour. Almost a year later in March 1978 the 
Tribunal released a report which concluded that the claim was not 
well - founded and no recommendation was made. 7 
This early Tribunal also dealt with a second claim made in relation to 
the threat to traditional Maori fisheries in the Manakau Harbour from 
the proposed construction of a thermal power station. While the 
Tribunal concluded that customary Maori fishing grounds would be 
affected, it declined to make any recommendation. The proposed 
project was in fact finally abandoned and the claim became redundant. 
Clearly, the Tribunal failed in those early years to meet Maori 
expectations and it was some five years before another claim was 
placed before it. The Tribunal failed dismally to gain the confidence 
of the Maori people or to promote itself as a forum where Treaty 
grievances could be heard. The Tribunal's procedure was clearly that 
of another pakeha administrative body similar to the Planning Tribunal 
or local planning committee. There was a failure to comprehend that 
in order for the Tribunal's findings to be viewed legitimately, be 
they negative or positive for Maori interests, the Tribunal itself had 
to be seen as a bicultural institution drawing from the Maori as much 
from the Pakeha. The Treaty was an agreement between two cultures, 
any body established to interpret and apply its principles to 
twentieth century New Zealand needed to represent that feature, not 
only in its membership but in its whole policy, approach and 
procedure. 
In 1982 a claim was lodged by the Te Atiawa tribe of Taranaki claiming 
that a planned outfall from the Motunui synthetic fuel project (a key 
project in the Governments "think- big" energy policy of the early 
eighties) would further pollute their traditional fishing grounds. 
The findings of the Tribunal were starkly clear. The rivers and reefs 
referred to in the claim constituted significant and traditional 
fishing grounds of the Hapu concerned and had suffered various degrees 
of pollution. As a result, the local Maori people were prejudicially 
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affected. The Motunui outfall would result in further destruction of 
the reef with the local Hapu being particularly prejudiced. 
Further, the Tribunal concluded that current legislation gave 
insufficient recognition and protection for Maori fishing grounds. 
The policies or practices of statutory bodies did not give or were 
unable to give priority to Maori interests in fishing grounds over and 
above the general interest. The Crown was failing to make appropriate 
law to protect Maori fishing grounds from pollution and for the 
control of Maori fishing grounds by Maori people.
8 Accordingly, the 
Crown was in clear breach of its Treaty obligations. 
The two major recommendations made by the Tribunal were that the 
proposal for an ocean outfall at Motunui be discontinued. Secondly 
that the Crown seek an alternative arrangement with the Waitara 
Borough Council for the discharge of the Syngas effluent through the 
Council's outfa11. 9 
The Government's initial reaction to the recommendations of the 
Tribunal were not positive. The findings of the Tribunal however, 
were supported by a large environmental lobby group and a vocal 
pressure group j8posed to the "Think Big" policy of the current 
administration. Ultimately, the Government wavered. The Motunui 
water right was cancelled and substituted by a right to discharge via 
an alternative outfall through the Waitara Borough's existing effluent 
facilities. This ultimate resolution will later be referred to in 
this paper as a negotiated compromise: something less than the strict 
application of the Treaty. The Tribunal although clear in its 
determination of a breach of the Treaty softened its recommendation as 
to a practical solution. This feature would it is submitted become a 
recurring characteristic of Tribunal recommendations and will be 
referred to in some detail later in this paper. 
The Te Atiawa claim must be considered as a watershed in terms of the 
Tribunal's development. How had this change come about? 
(a) More strident Maori claims for the recognition of the Treaty. 
The growth of Maoridom had realised the Treaty of Waitangi Act 
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1975 itself. The development of the Tribunal's effectiveness was 
a logical progression of this movement. 
(b) The claim had the support of a strong pakeha environmental lobby 
group, and there was significant public opposition to the "Think 
Big" projects. Accordingly, Maori aspirations were supported by 
popular opinion, if only for environmental and political reasons. 
11 
(c) The personnel of the Tribunal gave the body a fresh focus, in 
particular its new Chairman, Judge Durie, greatly influen1ed the 
character of the decision and subsequent recommendations. 
2 
(d) The new procedure of the Tribunal and its enhanced research 
13 
resources rendered it a more qualified and accessible body. 
The hearing of the Motunui claim was held on a local Marae. In 
particular, respect was paid to Marae protocol. The Tribunal noted in 
its report that there was to be regard not only to civil law, but to 
Maori customary or ancestral law as well . 14 Such innovations assisted 
the Tribunal to gain the confidence of Maori who could perceive the 
Tribunal as being less mono- cultural than its early predecessor and 
certainly more sympathetic to their aspirations. It was this 
innovative approach to its procedure which marked the Waitangi 
Tribunal as being different from other boards and bodies. The 
Tribunal could be seen as a bicultural institution giving equal weight 
to traditional Maori custom. 
In the years to follow, the Tribunal made recommendations in respect 
of a number of substanti ve claims: -
(a) The Kaituna Claim: On 30 November 1984 the Tribunal recommended 
to the Crown that sewerage should not be permitted to be 
discharged into the Kaituna River near Rotorua as it would 
prejudicially affect traditional fishing grounds. 15 
(b) The Manukau Claim: On 9 July 1985 the Tribunal recommended 
changes to policy and legislation and the implementation of a 
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plan to improve the environment of the Manukau Harbour. The 
claim involved a number of matters involving fishing, farming, 
industrial development and tribal land around the Manukau 
Harbour. Many of the issues fell outside the post 1975 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. This did not deter the Tribunal 
from venturing back before 1975 in order to establish whether 
breaches of the principles of the Treaty had occurred since that 
cut- off date. 16 The practical approach by the Tribunal 
highlighted the artificiality of limiting claims (intrinsically 
historic in their reliance on Treaty principles) to matters 
arising after 1975. 
(c) The Te Reo Maori Claim: On 29 April 1986 the Tribunal 
recommended to the Crown that there be changes in education, 
broadcasting and state services policy to protect and promote the 
Maori language; the establishment of a Maori Language Commission 
and the legalising of the use of Maori in official proceedings. 
The Tribunal found that the Maori language was a taonga 
guaranteed to be protected by the Crown pursuant to the Treaty. 
17 The Crown had so far failed to actively protect the language. 
(d) The Waiheke Claim: On 2 June 1987 a claim in respect of the land 
on Waiheke Island was upheld by the Tribunal when it recommended 
to the Crown that the Waiheke lands be restored to the Ngati 
Paoa. The Tribunal found that the Crown by disposing of the 
Waiheke lands without enquiring as to the position of the Ngati 
Paoa (who had~~ that time become landless), had acted contrary 
to the Treaty. 
( e) The Orakei Claim: On 4 November 1987 the Tribunal recommended to 
the Crown that particular lands be returned to the Ngati Whatua 
who had become virtually landless, and that an endowment be 
granted by the Crown to assist in tribal rehabilitation. The 
Tribunal concluded that the tribe had lost its land through the 
acts and omissions of the Crown who had failed to protect the 
tribes interests contrary to the Treaty. What is of note also is 
that the Tribunal asked the Attorney- General to consider pardons 
and remissions of fines for protestors who had sought to bring 
] 3. 
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the injustices which had now been confirmed by the Tribunal to 
the attention of the Crown. This consideration however did not 
take the form of a "recommendation". The Tribunal noted that to 
breach the law in the course of protest was inconsistent with the 
Treaty. The Attorney- General declined to reconsider the 
offenders' position. 19 
(f) Muriwhenua Claim: On 8 December 1986 and 31 May 1988 the 
Tribunal submitted two interim reports to the Crown, the latter 
in relation to the ownership of fisheries by Maori and the 
wrongful assumption and control over those fisheries without 
prior negotiation contrary to the Treaty by the Crown. The first 
report recommended that the transfer of Crown land to S.O.E. 's 
not be made until Maori interests in the land could be 
protected. 20 Both reports had significant political and legal 
consequences. 
(g) Mangonui Sewa e Claim: In August 1988 the Tribunal concluded 
that the basis for a claim objecting to a Sewage Scheme had been 
made out, however, the interests of the community generally were 
such that no recommendation to change the site of a sewerage 
21 treatment pond should be made. 
The Tribunal dealt with a number of other claims throughout this 
period but declined to make any recommendations. It should also be 
noted that currently the Tribunal is considering the large Ngai Tahu 
South Island claim which includes claims to fisheries, lands and 
forests throughout the South Island. The Tribunal has yet to report 
in relation to the land issues associated with the Muriwhenua claim. 
The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 and the Procedures of the Tribunal 
The functions of the Tribunal are two- fold. 
(a) Pursuant to Section 8 the Tribunal is empowered to examine and 
report on whether any proposed legislation is inconsistent with 
the principles of the Treaty. Such legislation can be referred 
to the Tribunal by resolution of the House of Representatives in 
[ 
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the case of a Bill and in the case of any proposed Regulations, 
or Orders in Counsel by any Minister of the Crown. The 
Tribunal's report is to be submitted to the Speaker in the case 
of a Bill and in the case of any subordinate legislation to the 
appropriate Minister. A copy of the report is required to be 
tabled in Parliament. 
Pursuant to Section 6 of the original Act the Tribunal is further 
empowered to consider claims by ~ny Maori or ~rou of Maori 
likely to be prejudicially affected by any_f_orm of le islation, 
Crown pol~ or practice, or any acts done after the commencement 
of the em owerin_g_ legislation on 10 October 1975. That 
limitation was subsequently repealed in 1985 and the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal extended back to 6 February 1840. 
Pursuant to Section 6(3) if the Tribunal finds that any claim is well 
founded, it can, if it thinks fit, having rejard to a_l_l _the 
circumstances of the case recommend to the Crown that action be taken 
to compensate for, or remove the prejudice, or to prevent other 
persons from being similarly affected in the future. This 
recommendation can either be in general terms or can specify the 
action the Crown should take in the given case. Subsection (5) 
provides that a sealed copy of the Tribunal's findings and 
recommendations, if any, are to be served on the claimant, the 
Minister of Maori Affairs and any other such Minister of the Crown, 
who in the opinion of the Tribunal have an interest in the claim and 
any other person the Tribunal thinks fit. 
Section 7 gives the Tribunal a discretion not to enquire into certain 
claims if they are trivial, frivolous or vexatious or not made in good 
faith, or if in the circumstances an adequate remedy or right of 
appeal, other than the right to petition Parliament or to complain to 
the Ombudsman is available to the applicant. Of note is the claim by 
Tom Te Weehi who had been convicted in the Christchurch District Court 
of breaches of the Fisheries Regulations. The Tribunal declined to 
hear his claim of customary Maori fishing rights until Court 
proceedings had finished. Subsequently Te Weehi was partially 
successful on appeal to the High Court which confirmed his traditional 
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fish i ng rights notwithstanding the existence of re~ulatory 
limitations. He subsequently withdrew his claim. 2 
In 1985 an amending Act reconstituted the Tribunal in the manner 
previously outlined. The most significant development however was the 
enlargement of the Tribunal's jurisdiction back to 6 February 1840. 
Since that amendment in 1985, the membership of the Tribunal has been 
increased, as have its administrative and research resources. 
A further significant development to the legislation was the Treaty of 
Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act 1988 which amended both the Treaty of 
Waitangi Act and the State Owned Enterprises Act. It has extended the 
power of the Tribunal in a manner which it is ventured was never 
contemplated when the Tribunal was first established in 1975. The 
1988 legislation, a product of the Court of Appeal decision The New 
Zealand Maori Council v. Attorne~- General & Others 23 effectively 
provided that no future claimants to the Tribunal would be prejudiced 
through the transfer of Crown land to State Owned Enterprises. The 
procedure enacted was to provide that any land so transferred was to 
be subject to a memorial being registered on the Certificate of Title 
of that land to the effect that it was subject to resumption by the 
Crown on the recommendation of the Tribunal. The Treaty of Waitangi 
(State Enterprises) Act 1988 went on to provide that if the Tribunal 
recommends a return of the land transferred to a State Owned 
Enterprise and no agreement can be reached with the Crown in relation 
to that recommendation for its return, the Tribunal's recommendation 
will be binding. 24 The Tribunal has accordingly become albeit in a 
limited area, a bod of final determination. 
Also of note, is the opportunity gi ven to State Owned Enterprises to 
apply to the Tribunal for clearance of the restriction placed on its 
title. 25 Accordingly, provision has been made for a non- Maori 
applicant to commence its proceedings within the Tribunal's 
jurisdiction. 
The Second Schedule to the Act as amended in 1988 provides for 
administrative and procedural matters. Clause 5 of the Schedule 
allows for the Tribunal to conduct hearings, adjourn and meet in 
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private or in public. Further, the Tribunal has the power to regulate 
its own procedure. The Tribunal has now made it a practice of 
conducting at least one of its hearings on an appropriate marae to 
hear the claimant's case. Clause 5(6) allows the Tribunal to have 
regard to, and adopt such aspects of "te kawa o te marae" as the 
Tribunal thinks appropriate in the particular case, but it is 
confirmed that no person shall be denied the right to speak during the 
proceedings of the Tribunal on the grounds of their sex. Marae 
protocol requires certain changes from conventional courtroom 
procedure. Witnesses are not required to take an oath or affirmation, 
although it is pointed out that "sanctions against not telling the 
truth on the Marae are at least as great as those applicable in the 
courtroom". It should also be noted that the Tribunal is sub~ect to 
judicial review and is bound by the rules of natural justice. 6 
The Tribunal's quorum must consist of at least three members of the 
Tribunal, including a presiding officer of whom at least one shall be 
Maori. A presiding officer may be, the Chairperson, a Judge of the 
Maori Land Court appointed by the Chairperson to so act or a member of 
the Tribunal appointed by the Chairperson who must be a barrister or 
solicitor of at least 7 years standing. 
Clause 5 further provides that in the event of disagreement, the 
Tribunal's decision shall be the majority of the members dealing with 
the matters, or if equally divided, the decision of the presiding 
officer. 
The Tribunal may act on any testimony, sworn or unsworn and may 
receive as evidence any statement, document, information or matter 
which in the opinion of the Tribunal may assist it to deal effectually 
with the matters before it. Of note however, is that the Evidence Act 
1908 shall apply to the Tribunal in the same manner as if the Tribunal 
were a court within the meaning of the Act. 
Clause 7 provides that any claimant may appear in person, or by leave 
of the Tribunal by counsel or other representative. Due to the 
factual and legal complexity of most of the claims, claimants and the 
Crown are represented by counsel. It is apparent that certain Crown 
13 
coun~el and indeed other practitioners in private practice are 
accumulating experience in appearing before the Tribunal and that this 
experience is to the assistance of the Tribunal .
27 
Clause 7A provides that the Tribunal may appoint counsel to either 
assist it in respect of the proceedings or may appoint counsel to 
assist the claimant if it is satisfied that it is of sufficient 
complexity and importance to warrant such an appointment. Such 
counsel shall be paid by the Crown. 
Clause 8 provides that the Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Commission 
of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1908 and be subject to 
the provisions of that Act with the exception of Sections 11 and 12 
which relate to costs. The Chairman of the Tribunal may summons 
witnesses to attend. 
Clause 9 allows for the appointment under the State Services Act 1962 
for a registrar of the Tribunal and more importantly for such research 
officer or officers, or other staff necessary for the efficient 
operation of the Tribunal. The Tribunal is further empowered to 
commission any person whether or not a member of its staff to 
investigate any matter relating to a claim and prepare and submit a 
report for consideration by the Tribunal. That report may be received 
in evidence. A copy is made available to all participants to allow 
them to make submissions if they see fit. The Tribunal regularly 
arranges for research to be done on the historic background of the 
claim either by its own staff or by contracted researchers. 
The Tribunal sits very much as an inquisitorial body, dependent to a 
large extent on its own research and resources. It is not involved in 
the adversarial process of determining a winner, rather it is involved 
in ascertaining a factual foundation upon which a decision can be 
made. Its procedure, much of which is self- imposed at its own 
discretion is designed to facilitate this function. The Waitangi 
Tribunal is clearly not a court in terms of the traditional definition 
of that word. 
[ 
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As stated the Tribunal sponsored research is made available to both 
the Crown and the claimants. A Pre-Trial Conference is held; with all 
counsel attending to discuss the mechanics of the hearings, issues, 
dates, times and witnesses. The first hearing is held on a marae with 
the proceedings being influenced by traditional Maori custom. The 
claimants case having been put the Tribunal adjourns to allow the 
Crown time to prepare its case in answer to the claimant's. The 
second hearing is invariably held in a European setting, either a hall 
or courtroom and in accordance with more typical courtroom 
28 procedure. 
The Principles of the Treaty and the Power of the Tribunal 
Clearly one of the major consequences of regular Tribunal decisions is 
the development of Treaty principles or jurisprudence. This paper 
does not attempt to analyse those principles. The future of the 
Tribunal however is inextricably linked with the manner in which it 
interprets the Treaty, adduces Treaty principles, and renders Treaty 
jurisprudence consistent and certain. Some reference to these 
principles illustrates where the Tribunal stands in relation to the 
traditional courts of law and the government. 
A Tribunal member, Mr D. Wilson makes the point that the Tribunal has 
as its function the task of "investigating whether the actions 
complained of are inconsistent with the 
with either or both of its two texts 11 • 29 
rinciples of the Treaty, not 
Where the Treaty has been 
referred to in Statute - the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986, 
Environment Act 1986, Conservation Act 1987, it is to "the principles 
of the Treaty". Accordingly, a determination of the principles of the 
Treaty goes to the very heart of the Tribunal's existence and 
function. Indeed, Judge Durie has stated that the Tribunal's 
"recommendations are perhaps not as important as its building up of a 
data base from which informed national strategies can be planned 11 •
30 
Clearly the "principles of the Treaty" are of greater importance than 
the text of the Treaty itself. Ultimately these principles will be 
determined by the courts when called upon to interpret legislation. 
Yet as exemplified in the Maori Council case31 , so much of what the 
Court of Appeal cited as principles of the Treaty had previously been 
15 
determined by the Tribunal. The Court of Appeal approved those 
principles but clearly was not willing and indeed could not 
acknowledge the Tribunal's findings as the source of those discerned 
Treaty principles. 
In the NZ Maori Council case, Cooke P. noted that the opinions of the 
Waitangi Tribunal should be given much weight but were not binding on 
the court. 32 While Somers J. noted that court decisions were binding 
h W . . T . b l 
33 on t e a1 tang1 ri una . 
Three interesting observations were made by the Parliamentary 
C . . . f h d. 
34 omm1ss1oner 1n respect o tat 1cta. 
The Waitangi Tribunal: 
(a) has the expertise and experience to define principles. 
(b) Under present law neither the courts nor the Crown are 
obliged to agree with the Tribunal's findings. 
(c) The Waitangi Tribunal membership reflects the Treaty 
partnership, the courts do not. 
While the necessity for the courts independence to look afresh at 
Treaty issues cannot be disputed the expertise, experience and 
membership of the Tribunal cannot be ignored. Such factors render the 
Tribunal's decisions legitimate and authoritative and accordingly it 
is submitted most influential. 
In terms of the formulation of Treaty principles - both the courts and 
the Tribunal agree that the Treaty is a living document and should be 
interpreted as such. However, both recognise that it is a fundamental 
constitutional rule that the law should be clear, accessible and 
accurate. It is crucial that there are clearly identifiable 
principles or guidelines, hence the reiteration of such fundamentals 
as Treaty partnership, tribal self- determination and active protection 
by the Crown, by both the Tribunal and the courts. 
16 
The issue of the standing of the reports of the Waitangi Tribunal was 
recently considered by Eichelbaum C.J. and McGechan J. in the High 
Court at Wellington in Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board & Others v. 35 -- ---
Attorney- Gener~l &_Others The High Court issued rulings on the 
effect and admissibility of the Waitangi Tribunal's Muriwhenua report 
in the Maori Fishing cases. 
The High Court held that the Muriwhenua report was not binding in 
Court proceedings as it referred to political not legal reality. The 
Tribunal reports were described as the "stuff of Government and not of 
law". The report was however admissible pursuant to Section 42 of the 
Evidence Act 1908 as evidence of fact and opinion on a matter relating 
to Maori bearing on the interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi and 
the Fisheries legislation, and as material relating to Maori fishing 
practices. It was noted that its weight howe ver may be affected by 
weaknesses in the report, and questions of base material and resources 
might arise. The High Court commented however that it would not be 
"so precious as to shut out that which is of value for fear of that 
which is not 11 • 36 
The court confirmed that while the Tribunal may have determined a 
Treaty issue the matter in no way could be considered as res judicata 
nor would any litigant be estopped from arguing the matter afresh 
before a court of law. 
While the courts have readily pointed out that they are obviously not 
bound by the findings of substance by the Tribunal and perhaps have 
distanced themselves from the influence of Tribunal findings the 
judiciary has given some weight to the proposition that the Crown ma1 
be obliged to follow its recommendations. Commentators have raised 
the issue of whether the Crown's failure without reasonable 
justification to give effect to a Tribunal recommendation may in 
itself constitute a further breach of the Treaty.
37 Cooke P. stated 
. th M . C · 1 38 1 n e aori ounc1 case; 
If the Tribunal finds merit in a claim and recommends redress it 
would only be in very special circumstances that the Crown as a 
[ 
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reasonable Treaty Partner, could justify withholding it - which 
would be only in very special circumstances if ever. 
One of the principles identified by Professor Orr's analysis of the 
Tribunal reports is that the Crown has a duty to remedy past breaches 
of the Treaty. 39 While Cooke P. preferred to keep the question open 
as to whether the Crown ought to grant the precise form of redress 
recommended by the Tribunal, the Court of Appeal has given a strong 
direction to the Crown that failure to act on Tribunal recommendations 
may lead to further claims. Such claims however, arising out of 
perhaps a current administration's failure to give effect to a 
Tribunal recommendation might have the effect of politicising the 
Tribunal. If the government felt bound to implement such 
recommendations it may favour the appointment to the Tribunal of those 
individuals who favour the government's view. That should be avoided. 
The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment has concluded in 
relation to Tribunal recommendations that ... 40 
the Crown must show that the alternative will be as likely to 
attain improved environmental quality, take full and balanced 
account of the principles of the Treaty ... and that: 
The Tribunal to date has shown sensitivity to all of these 
matters in making its recommendations but the Crown is not acting 
on Tribunal advice and has so far failed to demonstrate that its 
chosen alternative will provide an equivalent or improved result. 
The Commissioner's view is that the Crown has no scope to move away 
from a complete implementation of recommendations unless it can 
provide an equivalent proposal sufficiently comparable to that 
recommended. The position is obviously enhanced where relevant 
legislation provides for the consideration of Treaty principles. It 
is difficult to accept however that there can be no room for policy 
discretion by the Executive which may conflict with the intent of a 
Tribunal recommendation. It is doubtful whether such a limitation on 
executive power is either feasible or possible in our constitutional 
system. Judge Durie has stated that the Tribunal's lack of final or 
] 
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binding power of determination may be an advantage and that it is 
perhaps best that it has no ultimate power. He maintains that should 
the Tribunal be given such power a degree of flexibility will be lost 
and the Tribunal rendered les1 able to grapple with many of the issues 
it currently adjudicates on.
4 
The flipside to the lack of any power of final determination is 
that Maori claims should hot be constrained by a need to fit the 
parameters of strict legal rights. 
As the Tribunal is not confined by the normal rules of law because it 
does not have the power of final decision, subject to the rules of 
natural justice, it may adapt its procedures to accommodate Maori 
claimants. 
P.G. McHugh has suggested that the Tribunal could be given coercive 
powers in cases where the Government indicates an unwillingness to act 
t d t . that 1·t makes.
42 Th t t f d l t or accep recommen a ions a ype o eve opmen 
may threaten however the "para- legal" approach which the Tribunal 
currently operates under. Claims at the moment are not restricted by 
political realities. Clearly the Tribunal has as its prime function 
the settlement of facts upon which a decision can be based. As a 
Tribunal it investigates and advises not just the Crown but the 
public. If its recommendations were to become binding, how political 
would the Tribunal become? What loss in its objectivity and 
impartiality would be perceived? 
It is submitted that the Tribunal's early failure may well have been 
its political unwillingness to confront the government of the day with 
findings at odds with current Government policy. Notwithstanding 
this, the Court of Appeal is strengthening the authority of the 
Tribunal's recommendations and the Treaty of Waitangi (State 
Enterprises) Act 1988 has indeed given the Tribunal an ultimate 
decision making power. 
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5. The Success of the Tribunal to Resolve Conflict and Provide Solutions 
It is suggested that the Tribunal's mana and influence continues to 
rise because it has shown an ability to resolve what are potentially 
massive national issues in a feasible manner. This can be illustrated 
by a review of basic issues of treaty interpretation and of a number 
of claims and resulting Tribunal recommendations. 
(a) The English and Maori texts of the Treaty 
- An Issue of Inter2_retation 
The preamble to the 1975 Act acknowledges the different texts - the 
English and Maori version of the Treaty. The Tribunal is specifically 
directed by the Act to determine those conflicts. 
The concept of sovereignty as found in the English text is to be 
compared with "rangatiratanga" - in the Maori version. The Tribunal 
has not shrinked from finding that the use of the term 
"Rangatiratanga" allows for a continuation of "Maori sovereignty" 
within the parameters of a tribal context. A comparison can be made 
with the sovereignty of the Indians of Canada and the United States 
which was not ceded in the North American Treaties. This sovereignty 
was acknowledged by the Canadian and United States Governments. A 
distinction has been made by the Tribunal however between the ceding 
of a right of "national" government and the authority of Maori to 
h . ff . 43 manage t e1r own a airs. 
The conclusion of the Tribunal in its Muriwhenua Fisheries report 
(1988) concludes that the Maori text of the Treaty did sufficiently 
grant the Crown sovereignty. The Tribunal equally lucidly concluded 
however that the cessation of sovereignty in Article 1 of the Treaty 
was subject to its obligations and responsibilities outlined in 
Article 2. That fundamental finding has established a foundation upon 
which the Tribunal may consider claims within a clearly defined 
framework. 
In the earlier Motunui claim, the Tribunal made some observations in 
respect of the possible conflicts between the two texts. These 
statements were largely based on a memorandum submitted by the 
20 
Department of Maori Affairs.
44 Lord McNair's text, "The Law of 
Treaties" was cited to the effect that "in the absence of a provision 
to the contrary, neither text is superior to the other". However, it 
was argued that should any question arise on which text should 
prevail, the Maori text should be treated as the prime reference since 
this was the text signed by most of the Chiefs. The Tribunal remains 
silent in respect of this proposition. The Tribunal did observe that 
it did not feel bound to confine itself to a literal interpretation of 
the Treaty. That it would have regard to extraneous means of 
interpretation such as the consideration of surrounding circumstances 
and that Treaties were to be interpreted "with reference to their 
declared or apparent objects and purposes" and even "the subsequent 
conduct and practice of the parties in relation to the Treaty
00
•
45 
While the Maori Affairs paper cited decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court to the effect that treaties made with Indian Tribes were 
to be construed "in the sense which they would naturally be understood 
by the Indians",
46 the Tribunal held that it was consistent both with 
European legal concepts and with the Maori approach that the 
47 Treaty's 
wairua or spirit is something more than a literal construction of 
the actual words used can provide. The Treaty transcends the sum 
total of its component written words and puts narrow or literal 
interpretations out of place. 
This interpretation of the broad spirit of the Treaty was confirmed in 
the Maori Council case where Richardson J. stated "What is important 
for present purposes is the approach and the emphasis, rather than the 
differences". 48
 
Judge Durie has stated in respect of this accommodation of the two 
T t 
. 49 
rea y versions 
... If we follow then the spirit of the Treaty, as gleaned from 
the surrounding circumstances there are few problems in the 
textual variations. If the texts are read to supplement and 
compliment each other, the differences are few. It is not a case 
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of deciding for the one text or the other, but rather of blending 
and harmonising the two. 
Judge Durie acknowledges the importance of the argument that the Maori 
text of the Treaty which was taken around the country was relied upon 
alone by Maori. However, he notes that the Tribunal has been directed 
to consider both texts and that it must be acknowledged that the other 
party, the Queen's representative, relied equally on the English text 
notwithstanding the rule in Jones v. Meehan
50 to the effect that the 
text in the indigenous language should be used in the event of an 
ambiguity. 
(b) Motunui Claim 
In the Motunui claim, while the Tribunal accepted the Treaty ceded 
sovereignty to the Crown it did not accept the interpretation of 
"rangatiratanga" as merely possession, but could be taken to mean "the 
highest Chieftainship". Accordingly, the Waitara fishing grounds was 
a tribal taonga pursuant to the Second Article of the Maori text of 
the Treaty, which afforded Maori people not only protection of the 
possession of their fishing grounds, but al 1o their "Mana" to control 
them in accordance with their own customs.
5 
As M.P.K. Sorrenson notes, such a finding had wide ranging 
consequences as it "struck at the very heart of the longstanding 
pakeha doctrine that the transfer of sovereignty in Article 1 provided 
the foundation for one system of law, British law".
52 Despite that 
"potentially radical finding" the Tribunal's final recommendations 
were "mild and conciliatory". The Tribunal had regard to the long 
title and preamble of the 1975 Act which referred to its 
responsibility when making recommendations for the "~ractical 
a lication of the Treat" The Tribunal noted that it was not 
53 
... inconsistent with the spirit and intention of the Treaty that 
the Crown and Maori people affected should agree to alter the 
incidence of the strict terms of the Treaty in order to seek 
acceptable, practical solutions. 
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That construction of interpretation would be repeated in following 
claims. Despite a clear finding of the Crown's breach of the Treaty, 
with consequential wide implications for the nation as a whole, the 
Tribunal in making its recommendation thereon assessed the best 
practical solution. The Tribunal noted that the Treaty was capable of 
adaptation to meet new circumstances and modern times. It need not 
lock society into a 1840 status quo. 
(c) Manukau Claim 
In the Manukau claim despite upholding in most parts the multifaceted 
claim, the Tribunal's recommendations were mild and conciliatory. The 
Tribunal noted that it would be unfortunate if Maori fishing rights 
fell to be determined on a literal interpretation of the Treaty which 
provides exclusive rights to all Maori fisheries. The Tribunal noted 
that it was necessary to make compromises to minimise conflict between 
Maori, private and commercial fishing interests and that various 
solutions should be can vassed for the recognition and protection of 
Maori fishing grounds and for compensation for such lost fisheries.
54 
In respect of the claim regarding New Zealand Steel's slurry pipeline 
which sought the transfer of water from the Waikato River into the 
Manukau, the Tribunal concluded that while such a transfer may be 
culturally offensive, the Tribunal noted:
55 
In our multi - cultural Society, the values of minorities must 
sometimes give way to those of a predominant culture, but in New 
Zealand, the Treaty of Waitangi gives Maori values an equal place 
with British values and a priority when the Maori interest in 
their taonga is adversely affected. 
Despite that acknowledgement and despite a recommendation for a change 
in New Zealand laws to admit Maori values, it was accepted that a 
water right to discharge water into the Manukau had been granted and 
it was hoped that an acceptable compromise with the claimants could be 
reached. 
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(d) Te Reo Maori Claim 
The Te Reo Maori claim, unlike the Manukau claim was confined to a 
single issue. Despite its simplicity, the Tribunal acknowledged it as 
being one of its most difficult insofar as it opened up political, 
social and financial ramifications.
56 
The Tribunal concluded that
57 
... by the Treaty the Crown did promise to recognise and protect 
the language and that this promise had not been kept. The 
guarantee in the Treaty requires affirmative action to protect 
and sustain the language, not a passive obligation to tolerate 
its existence and certainly not a right to deny its use in any 
place. 
Having come to that conclusion, the recommendations by the Tribunal 
were reconciliatory and practical. The Tribunal declined a demand 
that all public documents, notices and newspapers should be printed in 
both Maori and English - largely on the ground of expense. While the 
Tribunal recommended that Maori ought to be allowed to be used in 
courts and when dealing with Government Departments or Local 
Authorities, it was not willing to require fluency in Maori as a 
prerequisite to employment in the civil Service. The establishment of 
a statutory body to supervise and foster the use of the Maori language 
was recommended. 
Thus, in the Te Rea Maori claim as in earlier ones, the Tribunal's 
findings were potentially radical, but its recommendations were mild 
and accommodating and could be achieved without much pain or expense 
to the predominant pakeha community.
58 
(e) Orakei Claim 
The Orakei claim followed a similar pattern. The claim was upheld. 
The Tribunal noted that the vesting of the whole of the land in 
question, then in communal ownership to thirteen members of the Ngati 
Whatua as legal owners to the complete exclusion of the great majority 
necessarily destroyed the Mana and authority of the Tribe over its 
land. The Crown had failed to comply with its statutory or Treaty 
L LI ... , V 
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obligations to ensure the Tribe would not be rendered landless. This 
earlier application of the Native Lands Acts of 1865 and 1867 was 
aggravated by the seizure under the Public Works Act of a ten acre 
block which resulted in the destruction of the Tribe's Marae in clear 
59 breach of the Treaty. 
Despite this clear finding of "illegal" Crown confiscation of what was 
now highly valued Auckland real estate, the recommendations of the 
Tr ·ibunal in respect of the Orakei claim were "restrained and 
achievable". It was accepted that the bulk of the land confiscated by 
the Crown had already passed into private ownership and that the 
remainder of state houses which had been built on the land had passed 
into private ownership. It recommended that preference be given to 
Members of the local tribe in the allocation of state housing in the 
area and a number of monetary arrangements be entered into to provide 
some compensation. This arrangement was based not upon recompensing 
the tribe in terms of the capital value of the land, but in a way that 
could provide it with an adequate economic base for the future. 
(f) Mangonui Claim 
In its Mangonui Sewage Report the Tribunal found the Crown to be in 
breach of the Treaty as there had been a failure to take Maori 
concerns into account when decisions on the sewage scheme were 
being considered. 
The Tribunal noted: 60 
The Treaty ... requires a balancing of interests in some cases, 
and a priority for Maori interests in others. This is one 
occasion where a balancing is needed and some compromises must be 
made ... The scheme, we note, has been arranged and changed to 
reduce the cultural impacts, and the continued possession and 
enjoyment of tribal land and fisheries is not in the 
circumstances unduly encroached upon. 
And found that: 61 
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Having regard to the customary opinion that wastes defile that 
which is esteemed, Maori planning would require the works to be 
elsewhere ... [however] the ponds should be resited ... only if 
there are reasonably practical alternatives ... Of the 
alternatives proposed, none is sufficiently free of other 
problems to warrant Parliamentary intervention to require the 
ponds' relocation. 
It is submitted that the Tribunal has repeatedly shown its ability to 
provide working solutions to what are complicated, emotive, economic 
and potentially far - reaching issues. Judge Durie credits the 
Tribunal's achievements to its present powers (or lack of power), its 
flexible procedures and inquisitorial function.
62 
The Waitangi Tribunal represents, in my view, a good intuitive 
response from the politicians, for although the Tribunal is not 
in the mainstream of the law, neither are many Maori claims. 
He stresses that Maori claims like all indigenous minority's claims 
are both justiciable and non- justiciable in character. Many claims 
are really political matters. While customary hunting and fishing 
rights could be readily defined by statutory enactment and would be 
clearly justiciable, such claims raise wider issues as to resource 
management and development policies. These larger questions are not 
justiciable coming within the broader ambit, not of legal rights, but 
of broad policy. Judge Durie notes that claims relevant to the Treaty 
of Waitangi extend from claims in respect of specific lands or fishing 
grounds to the claims for greater Maori participation in society and 
the sharing of political and economic power. Accordingly, the Treaty 
is a potential source of particular legal rights for indigenous 
people; and a political statement of policy.
63 
Having made that observation as to the substance of the Treaty, Judge 
Durie states that he is not convinced that the most beneficial basis 
for Maori/Pakeha relationship should be reliance on a judicial 
response. Conversely he maintains the protection of native rights 
should not depend on political appeal alone.
64 McHugh, another 
commentator on indigenous people's legal rights confirms this dilemma. 
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A purely political process is viewed as being unsatisfactory to 
resolve native claims. Negotiation, conciliation and settlement 
rather than adversarial confrontation is regarded as being more 
appropriate when dealing with such issues. 65 
The Tribunal as a mechanism is a compromise between the judicial and 
political elements of Treaty issues. The Crown maintains it cannot be 
bound by the Tribunal in respect of what are policy matters. The High 
court maintains that the Tribunal's reports do not deal with legal 
reality despite judicial endorsement by the Court of Appeal of the 
Treaty principles distilled by the Tribunal . 66 It is submitted that 
the Tribunal has accordingly achieved a fair balance in terms of its 
procedure, and in terms of the substance of its recommendations. 
Judge Durie has accurately described the Tribunal as working within a 
semi - 1 ega l framework: 67 . 
The Tribunal; investigates, researches, makes finding on past 
practices and current policy in light of the Treaty and then 
recommends in the context of modern practicalities. 
Can we ask anything more from such a body? Is it viable for any 
agency to do more without upsetting the balance? 
His Honour notes that this semi - legal approach has the benefit of: - 68 
(a) A judicial tradition to bring order to its proceedings and 
provide a level of independence from political interference. 
( b) Making specific findings of fact and interpretation in the 
context of a particular case. 
(c) Restoring Maori faith in legal processes. 
(d) Preventing claims from being restricted by political necessities . 
The facts have to be determined before a settlement is reached. 
(e) Allowing for the accumulation of Treaty jurisprudence, rendering 
both the Maori and the Crown's position more certain. 
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The Tribunal in its semi - legal framework acts as a guide for the 
Courts and the Crown. This allows for the longterm development of a 
political, social and legal framework which may be referred to by the 
judiciary when it is required to have regard to the Treaty, and by the 
executive in its political negotiations outside the Tribunal. 
The Future of the Tribunal 
McHugh notes that native land claims are polycentric problems - there 
being too many insoluble issues for any one agency to handle. 69 
Clearly the legal and political character of Maori claims have that 
feature. There existed in New Zealand no institution capable of 
addressing such issues within the compass of its own resources and 
expertise. 
The Waitangi Tribunal has proven itself able to tackle those issues. 
In doing so, it is creating Treaty jurisprudence rendering the 
interpretation of the Treaty more certain. As the Tribunal continues 
to "charter a course between judicial and political responsibility 1170 
it is becoming increasingly apparent that its semi - judicial 
flexibility is the main reason for its success. Its lack of power to 
bind claimants and Crown has allowed it to have special regard to a 
wider sense of social justice allowing for practical and realistic 
solutions. It is doubtful whether the Tribunal would have been so 
successful if its recommendations were binding. Ultimately the 
Tribunal, being a creature of statute is dependant on the political 
administration of the time, its history is indicative of that. 
Fortunately Maori claims are now being recognised as being legalistic 
in nature rather than just moral and the jurisprudence being 
accumulated by the Tribunal is enhancing its own future as an 
institution of authority. This has been further advanced by the Court 
of Appeal's affirmation of much Tribunal jurisprudence and its 
promotion of the Treaty as an instrument of statutory interpretation. 
The present Government's confidence in the Tribunal is illustrated in 
the provisions of the Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act 1988, 
the enlargement of the Tribunal's membership, and the greater 
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provision of research and administrative resources, all of which 
reaffirms the Tribunal's current inquisitorial and advisory function. 
Presently the Tribunal continues to gain the confidence of claimants, 
the Crown, the Courts and the community in general. Its 
recommendations are being interpreted as an extension of the Treaty 
itself, creating a distinct Treaty obligation on the Crown and thus 
giving those recommendations both political and legal force. It may 
be that this current widespread support for the Tribunal and its work 
could be undermined if its decisions become binding. It is doubtful 
whether presently the Tribunal has the "legitimacy" in terms of its 
constitution, procedure and powers to bind Governments on what will 
become perhaps some of the most significant, social and economic 
issues that the country may face in the future. 
C. THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION 
The Waitangi Tribunal continues to develop as a mechanism for 
resolving Maori Treaty claims. While political opinion varies as to 
the exact nature of the Tribunal's character its abolition has not 
been actively encouraged by either main political party, and its 
future appears assured at least in the short to medium term. 
In the United States a not dissimilar body to the Waitangi Tribunal, 
The Indian Claims Commission has now been extinct for over ten years. 
Yet for some forty- two years after the Second World War it was the 
focus for native American Indians seeking compensation for historic 
claims against the Federal Government. 
While the Indian Claims Commission can be categorised with the 
Waitangi Tribunal, the two bodies are distinct. Each entity's 
function involves or did involve, the resolution of disputes between 
an indigenous people and central government however each institutions 
approach to similar issues was quite different. A comparative 
analysis of the two bodies is not proposed, however some examination 
of the Indian Claims Commission will hopefully illustrate many of the 
positive characteristics of the New Zealand Tribunal's approach and 
procedure. 
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Development of the Indian Claims Commission 
On 13 August 1946, the United States Congress passed legislation that 
created the Indian Claims Commission. It was a legislative response 
to deficiencies in the existing Federal law which had frustrated 
American Indians pursuing treaty based claims. 
Prior to the establishment of the Commission, Indian tribes had no 
means of pursuing grievances based on treaty rights and obligations 
against the Federal Government. In the mid nineteenth century Indian 
tribes had attempted to use the newly created United States Court of 
Claims. This Court established in 1855 during the United States Civil 
War, was a means by which former members of the southern confederacy 
were able to bring suit against the Government to seek compensation 
for losses suffered during the hostilities. It continued as a means 
by which United States citizens could seek redress against the Federal 
Government. 
The Court viewed Tribes as foreign nations and the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity effectively barred any type of Indian tribal claim 
against the United States Government. In 1863 an amendment to the 
Courts enabling legislation specifically excluded tribal claims based 
on treaties from the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. Indian 
tribes were limited to petitioning Congress to pass special enabling 
legislation to give the Court of Claims jurisdiction to adjudicate on 
specified Indian tribal claims. Congress enacted some 142 such Acts, 
the first being passed in 1881.
71 
This system of petitioning Congress caused great delay, was 
inefficient and limited Indians to one specific claim. Petitioning 
tribes had to prima facie prove their claim to Congress and then take 
a minor place within the list of legislative priorities of the time. 
These special jurisdiction Acts were limited to a particular tribe, or 
band, and limited the cause of action to a specific issue. 
Often, litigation founded on such an enabling Act was frustrated by 
the Court of Claims ruling that either the basis of the claim or some 
additional or alternati ve claim lay outside the special jurisdiction 
which had been given to the Court. An example of this was 
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North- Western Band of Shoshone Indians v. United States 
72 . The 
enabling legislation limited the claim to one based upon the "Box 
Elder" treaty. The Court refused to consider whether the tribe may 
have had a legitimate right to compensation for lost land based on an 
aboriginal title. 73 
The difficulties and frustrations experienced over this period were 
summarised in the Merriam Re ort of 1928.
74 
The conviction in the Indian mind is that justice is being denied 
and that any co- operation between the Government and the Indian 
is rendered extremely difficult by the long period of time, 
sometimes up to forty years, required to hear and determine the 
claims under various jurisdictional Acts. 
A succession of legislati ve attempts were made to introduce Bills to 
create a separate Court of Indian claims. On 6 January 1930 a Bill 
was introduced into the House of Representatives but failed to pass. 
In April 1934 a Senate Bill was introduced for the same purpose. It 
was reintroduced in January 1935. In the same year a Bill to create 
an Indian Claims Commission was introduced in the House of 
Representatives. This House Bill was preferred by the Executive which 
indicated to the Chairman of the Committee on Indian Affairs that it 
preferred the concept of a Commission, as opposed to a Court. The 
Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, wrote to the Chairman of the 
Committee on Indian Affairs stating that the difficulties with the 
previous system had not been so much the congestion in the existing 
Court of Claims, but rather the unavoidable delay in assembling the 
requisite data that was required to be presented to that Court by 
various Government agencies. He noted that the House Bill creating an 
Indian Claims Commission placed the onus on the Commission to 
in vestigate the claims and make an independent search for the 
evidence. "It is believed some legislation of that type would be 
preferable to the establishment of a new Court for the adjudication of 
such claims. 1175 
A Bill was introduced in the Senate to create an Indian Claims 
Commission in May 1935. The Bill was reintroduced again in 1937, 
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1940, 1941, 1944 and 1945. In May 1946, yet another Bill was 
introduced by Mr Henry Jackson. He stated in addressing the House of 
R t 
. 76 epresen atives-
Let us pay our debts to the Indian tribes that sold us the land 
we live on ... let us make sure that when the Indians have their 
day in Court they have an opportunity to present all their claims 
of every kind, shape and variety, so that this problem can truly 
be solved once and for all ... 
This Bill was passed into law by President Truman in August 1946. The 
political impetus to pass legislation was to improve the Federal 
Governments image towards minority groups. Ostensibly the reform was 
passed as a tribute to the contribution of Indians to the war 
effort. 77 The following Statement of Frank Fools Crow of the Lakota 
Treaty Council however may be a more accurate assessment as to the 
G 
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overnments motivation. 
We know the underlying policy behind the Claims Commission Act 
and we are not fooled. The Government intends to clear title to 
the land illegally taken, to clear their own conscience before 
they terminate us ... I wonder where the white man ever got the 
idea that these wrongs had to be settled in his courts by his 
rules. 
Indian Claims Commission 
The Indian Claims Commission Act created a Tribunal consisting of 
three Commissioners (one being a Chief Commissioner) to decide various 
claims brought against the Federal Government by tribes, bands, and 
identifiable groups of American Indians. 
The Commission had jurisdiction to hear the following claims:
79 
(a) Claims in law or equity arising under the Constitution, laws, 
treaties of the United States and executi ve orders of the 
President. 
32 
(b) All other claims in law or equity, including those in tort with 
which the claimant would have been entitled to sue in the 
ordinary courts if the United States were subject to such suit. 
(c) Claims which would result if the treaties, contracts and 
agreements between the claimant and United States were revised on 
the grounds of fraud, duress, and unconscionable consideration, 
mutual or unilateral mistake, whether of law or fact, or any 
other ground cognizable by a Court of equity. 
(d) Claims arising from the taking by the United States, whether as a 
result of a treaty cession or otherwise, of land owned or 
occupied by the claimant without the payment for such land of 
compensation agreed to by the claimant. 
(e) Claims based upon fair and honourable dealings that were not 
recognised by any existing rule of law or equity. 
Accordingly, Indian tribes were given the same means to make claims to 
the Commission as Non- Indians had to the Court of Claims. However, a 
new set of claims was introduced. These "moral claims 1
180 created a 
new jurisdiction which could extend to allegations of mis- management 
by administrative authorities of Indians financial and natural 
resources. 
The broad jurisdiction given to the Commission was to encompass every 
conceivable tribal grievance, hence the additional jurisdiction based 
upon the principle of "fair and honourable dealings". The 
comprehensiveness of this wide jurisdiction was however qualified by a 
number of features which in many ways characterised the true 
motivation of the authorities in establishing the Commission. 
(a) Claims were limited to those accruing before 13 August 1946. No 
claims arising after that date could be considered by the 
Commission. The Court of Claims was however given jurisdiction 
on a more limited basis to determine such matters. 
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(b) Tribes were given until 13 August 1951 to file claims with the 
Commission. Any claim not filed within that five year period was 
forever barred from consideration by the Commission. Prior to the 
cut-off date, 370 petitions were filed, many containing a number of 
claims. 605 docketed claims were ultimately filed.
81 
(c) Remedies were limited to monetary payments. In no case were the 
resources which the tribe had been deprived of returned, nor 
other substitute resources made available. 
(d) In determining the quantum of relief, the Commission could make 
deductions based on set- offs, counterclaims and other demands 
that would be allowable if brought in the Court of Claims. 
Further- 82 
( e) 
The Commission may also enquire into and consider all money 
or property given to, or funds extended gratuitously for the 
benefit of the claimant and if it finds that the nature of 
the claim and the entire course of dealings in accounts 
between the United States and the claimant in good 
conscience warrants such action, may settle all or part of 
such expenditures against any award made to the claimant. 
That deduction for such gratuities by the Federal Government was 
limited to a cause of action based on moral claims of "fair and 
honourable dealings". 
The Indian Claims Commission was given a mandate to decide all 
cases within ten years. Initially it was to expire on 
13 August 1956. That estimate proved unrealistic and the 
Commission's life was extended on a number of occasions in order 
to allow it to deal with its large caseload. The Commission was 
finally disbanded on 30 September 1978 with all its unfinished 
business being transferred to the Court of Claims for 
l t . 83 comp e 10n. 
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3. The Court of Claims 
In 1946 the then existing Court of Claims was given jurisdiction over 
tribal claims against the United States that arose after the 
commencement of the work of the Commission in August 1946. Those 
claims however were limited to ones that arose under the constitution, 
laws, or treaties of the United States, or executive orders of the 
President, or if the claim would otherwise have been cognizable in the 
Court of Claims had the claimant not been an Indian tribe.
84 
lhus a second forum previously denied was made available to Indian 
groups. Further, cases transferred to the Court of Claims after the 
abolition of the Commission in 1978 meant that this Court was also 
able to deal with moral or equitable claims available under the Indian 
Claims Commission Act, the Court of Claims having always been able to 
deal with such claims on appeal from the Commission. 
The Court of Claims in dealing with Indian claims post 1946 has not 
been subject to the same delay as many of the claims dealt with by the 
Commission. Obviously the currency of such claims did not require the 
historical investigation and research associated with the Commission's 
work. With only one avenue of appeal that being review by the Supreme 
Court, a final determination was more rapid. The Court of Claims 
however like the Commission has perpetuated two acknowledged 
difficulties: namely the cost of litigation which may bar some suits 
and secondly the restriction on the Court of Claims to award only 
monetary damages. 
The establishment of the Indian Claims Commission and the continuation 
of that work in a more limited capacity by the Court of Claims did not 
prevent the resolution of a number of tribal claims based upon 
individual legislative intervention. For example: -
(a) Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 1971 - extinguished all 
claims based on aboriginal title in Alaska in consideration for 
962.5 million dollars and 40 million acres of land. 
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(b) In 1978, Congress passed similar legislation to resolve Indian 
claims to land on Rhode Island by appropriating Federal funds to 
purchase lands for the Indian claimants. 85 
Mechanics and Procedure of the Commission 
The Commission's enabling legislation provided for the appointment of 
three Commissioners by the President (later enlarged to five). Two of 
the members of the Commission were required to be lawyers, with not 
more than two members being of the same political party. The 
Commissioners would hold office until the dissolution of the 
Commission which initially was thought to be only five years. No 
Commissioner was to engage in business or employment during his or her 
term. No Commissioner was allowed for some two years after his or her 
term to represent an Indian tribe, band or group, or have any 
financial interest in the outcome of any tribal claim. Two 
Commissioners constituted a quorum. 86 
The Commission was empowered to appoint a 
employees as were required to conduct its 
had full power to establish its own rules 
clerk and such other 
b . 
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of procedure. 88 
Most importantly, the Commission was obliged to establish an 
investigation division to investigate all claims referred to it for 
the purpose of discovering the facts thereof. This division was 
required to make a complete and thorough search for all evidence 
effecting each claim, utilising records held in various Government 
Departments and agencies. This evidence was to be made available to 
the Commission, to the Indians so concerned and any other interested 
Federal agency. 89 The Commission was further given the power to call 
upon any Department for information and to use all records and reports 
made by the Committees of each House of Congress. Further provision 
was made to give access to Indian groups of letters, papers, documents 
and records that may be useful in the preparation of any claim, all of 
which could be used as evidence by the Commission. 90 
Indian groups were specifically entitled to retain legal counsel. The 
fees of such lawyers unless otherwise determined by the Indian groups 
would be fixed by the Commission, but were not to exceed 10% of the 
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amount recovered in any case.
91 The Attorney-General would represent 
the United States in all claims presented to the Commission and had 
the power to settle any claim presented. Notwithstanding that 
authorisation to seek compromise, it would be the official policy of 
the Department of Justice throughout the existence of the Commission 
not to make settlement offers.
92 
Monies were specifically appropriated for the establishment of a fund 
from which the Security of the Interior could make loans to Indian 
groups for use by them in obtaining expert assistance, other than the 
assistance of legal counsel for the preparation of any claims. No 
such loan would be made available if the Indian group had available on 
deposit in the Federal Treasury or elsewhere such money that could pay 
for such expert assistance. Significantly this facility to pay for 
expert preparation was made available via an amendment to the 
legislation in 1963. The loans were repayable, together with interest 
out of the proceeds of any judgment recovered by the tribe from its 
claim. If no judgment was recovered or the amount of the judgment was 
inadequate, the amount outstanding could be made non - repayable by the 
Secretary of the Interior.
93 
The Commission was required to give reasonable notice to interested 
parties of hearings. Such interested parties were required to be 
given an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence before any 
final determination on the claim was made.
94 The Commission was 
empowered to administer oaths, subpoena witnesses to attend or to 
produce necessary documents, and to take depositions in any State of 
the United States.
95 
The final determination of the Commission was to be in writing and to 
. l d 96 inc u e: -
(a) Its findings of facts upon which its conclusion was based. 
(b) A statement: 
( i ) whether there were any just grounds for relief of the 
claimant and if so, the amount thereof; 
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whether there were any allowable offsets, 
counterclaims, or other deductions and if so, the 
amount thereof. 
(c) A statement of its reasons for its findings and conclusions. 
The Commission could state a question of law for the Court of Claims. 
There was also a right of appeal upon notice within three months from 
the date of the filing of the determination of the Commission to 
appeal to the Court of Claims.
97 This gave the Court of Claims on 
appeal the same jurisdiction to affirm, modify or set aside any final 
determination of the Commission. Determinations of question of law by 
the Court of Claims could be reviewed by the Supreme Court of the 
United States. 
After the proceedings had been finally concluded, the Commission was 
required to report to Congress. 98 When a report to Congress indicated 
an entitlement by the Indian group to recover, such a report was to 
have the effect of a final judgment of the Court of Claims. The 
legislation provided for the appropriation of such sums as were 
necessary to pay such final determinations of the Commission. Such a 
payment would discharge the United States of all claims and further 
demands. 99 
Indian Claims Commission - A Court or an Inquiry 
The establishment of the Indian Claims Commission involved a conscious --
rejection of a similar proposal to establish a specific Indian Claims 
Court. The Commission's task was to be completed in ten years and was 
viewed as an opportunity to expedite Indian claims, many of which had 
lasted some twenty to forty years when brought before the Court of 
Claims via special jurisdictional Acts. Yet the fact that the 
Commission was not disbanded until 1978 meant that many of the claims 
filed with the Commission dragged on for over 25 years. 
The old system of jurisdictional Acts enabling claims to be brought 
before the traditionally regulated Court of Claims involved enormous 
cost, lobbying and delay in order to obtain enabling legislation and 
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the repetition of that cost, delay, preparation and investigation upon 
presentation of the claim to the court itself. There was the real 
risk of the language of the jurisdictional act failing to adequately 
provide fo r the claim intended, and the enormous use of public monies 
of which only a small amount was directed to any Indian . It was 
expected that with the establishment of the Commission such 
difficulties would be avoided . It was hoped that the Commission would 
provide final and lasting resolutions for Indian claims, and bring the 
use of public monies in this area to a halt. 
In rejecting the concept of a court in fa vour of a "Commission" it was 
the clear intent of the legislature to place the onus of investigation 
and the collation of resource material on the Commission. Further, 
the Commission was to be sufficiently flexible to regulate its 
proceedings and manage its workload to meet the expectations of the 
legislators. 
The Commission itself was specifically directed to establish an 
investigation division to investigate all claims referred to it. This 
division was to make a complete and thorough search for all evidence 
affecting each claim, utilising all the documents and records in the 
possession of the Court of Claims and several Government Departments, 
and to submit such evidence to the Commission.
100 Indeed, when 
Secretary Ickes indicated his preference for the House Bill to the 
Senate Bill, he commented on how the House Bill placed an onus on the 
Commission to complete a search for all evidence affecting Indian 
claims and to hold hearings, examine witnesses, take depositions and 
issue subpoenas. While the Commission was also required to give 
reasonable notice to interested parties and gi ve them an opportunity 
to be heard and present evidence before making any final determination 
on the claim, this was no more than the recognisation of a fundamental 
rule of natural justice. The other procedural features and 
investigatory means made available to the Commission clearly indicated 
that the approach to be adopted was to be significantly less than 
adversarial . 
If the legislati ve intent was clear, it is equally unequivocal that 
the Commission throughout its life did in fact adopt an adversarial 
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approach placing an emphasis on each party presenting its evidence 
before it and giving the opposing litigant an opportunity to knock 
that case down. Indicative of that procedural development was the 
1963 Amendment which provided for loan monies to be made available to 
Indian tribes and groups to utilise expert assistance in the 
preparation and presentation of its claim . It is implicit that 
initially this type of work was to be done by the Commission itself. 
The mandatory establishment of the Commission's investigation division 
however saw the appointment of one staff member. No other staff 
member was assigned to the division and the required search for files 
and evidence amounted to a number of enquiries by mail to various 
tribes involved in the particular claim.
101 
The Commission sat as a judicial body performing no independent 
investigation. It was totally dependant upon the evidence adduced 
before it by the Department of Justice and by the claimants. There 
can be no doubt that this dependence on the adversarial system, 
whereby the Commission remained aloof from the controversies argued 
before it contributed to the considerable delay which saw a ten year 
framework expanded to a thirty- two year one. 
While there was no requirement on claimants being represented by 
attorneys, the Attorney- General was required to be represented by 
legal counsel. Accordingly, no claimant who appeared before the 
Commission was without legal representation, further emphasizing the 
strict "court- like" approach the Commission chose to take. 
Commentators have noted that while this use of counsel to develop the 
complex facts caused much delay it was considered the only means to 
have a thorough presentation of all relevant material .
102 One of the 
reasons given by Margaret Pierce, one of the members of the Indian 
Claims Commission for this adversarial approach was that both the 
Indians and Congress wanted'' ... the facts and the law involved in 
Indian claims against the sovereign to be fully and finally 
established 11 • 103 She confirms that the Commission adjudicated on 
claims which were litigated before it in a completely adversarial 
manner. The Government was allowed to rely on any normal cou rtroom 
defence, despite what merit it may have in comparison to the substance 
of the claim. 
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As is characteristic of claims of this type, much expert evidence was 
required to be adduced. Historians, anthropologists, real estate 
valuers and accountants were only some of the specialist witnesses 
that claimants and Justice Department attorneys needed to call. 
Typically, the claims became the subject of a number of hearings at 
which various issues relevant to the stage to which the claim had 
progressed were canvassed. It was not until 1968 that the Commission 
instituted pre-trial conferences, required expert testimony to be 
submitted in advance and had some form of pleadings presented to it to 
clarify contested issues.
104 
Performance of the Commission 
Undoubtedly, the Indian Claims Commission failed to meet the 
expectations of Congress in terms of its intent to resolve all Indian 
claims within ten years of its establishment. It may be that such an 
expectation was unrealis tic given the complexity of the claims 
involved. However, the procedural resources and flexibility given to 
the Commission had it chosen to adopt an inquisitorial character were 
such that its finite workload should not have extended unfinished to 
1978. 
The Commission itself identified three reasons for the delays. 
Overworked Justice Department Indian Claims Unit defending the claims. 
Secondly, staff shortages in the general accounting office required to 
provide the Commission with audits of tribal funds and property held 
by the Federal Government. Thirdly, the volume of work involved in 
reconstructing transactions stretching back a century in the chaotic 
state of the Bureau of Indian Affairs records.
105 It is submitted 
that all three sources of delay relate to resource problems outside 
the Commission itself and could have been resol ved had the Commission 
taken upon itself the main burden of the investigation. 
Indian Tribal grievances were not finally resolved.
106 There was a 
lack of notification of the Commission's establishment and/or the 
requirement that a tribe file its claim within the five year deadline. 
Congress in 1980 enacted a special jurisdictional Bill to allow the 
Court of Claims to hear the claim of a tribe which had failed to meet 
the filing dead- line because of non- notification.
107 
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The Sioux and other tribes whose pre 1946 petitions were dismissed by 
the Court of Claims on procedural or technical grounds attempted to 
re- litigate their claims before the Commission. Such matters were 
ruled as res judicata by the Commission, despite the merits or 
substance of the claims remaining unstudied. The natural justice of 
reopening such cases led to Congress authorising the renewal of the 
Sioux claim in 1978 in the face of the Justice Department Indian 
Cl . U . , . . 108 aims nits opposition. 
The Commission's measure of damages in most claims was based on the 
market va lue of the land at the time of its taking without adjustment 
for inflation. Accordingly many Indian groups despite success before 
the Commission continued to feel aggrieved and inadequately 
compensated. The Commission adopted the practice of the Court of 
Claims of not allowing interest unless title to the land had already 
been recognised by the United States and further not unless the land 
had been taken without the tribes' consent, such taking having been 
ratified by Congress. Aboriginal land never recognised by treaty as 
being owned by the tribe, was not recognised as giving a right to 
interest. 
The Commission's handling of "gratuitous offsets" often proved to be 
inequitable. The Government invariably sought to include "gratuitous 
services" as being those paid with the tribal claimants own funds. 
The Federal Government further sought to deduct the cost of grants and 
contracts awarded to tribes under recent laws such as the Indian Self 
Determination Act 1975. It should be noted however, that the 
Commission was less inclined to allow deduction of "gratuities" than 
the Court of Claims. The Commission made findings as to offsets in 37 
claims. It further approved settlements of 149 claims in offsets 
issues. Liquidated offsets amounted to only 9.6 million dollars, or 
less than 2% of all awards. 109 
As has already been emphasised the Commission's traditional procedural 
approach caused great delay. Its adherence to adversarial procedures, 
its lack of encouragement to litigants to settle claims (something 
specifically provided for within the Act), and its disregard of its 
discretion to refer questions of law to the Court of Claims were some 
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of the repeated criticisms made by commentators when examining the 
effectiveness of the Commission. In 1968, John Vance became Chairman 
of the Commission. He was scathing as to the way in which the 
Commission had then so far organised its proceedings;
110 
... , the Indian Claims Commission has failed throughout the time 
of its existence to exercise the initiative in hearing and 
determining the claims filed before it. It has not certified 
questions of law to the Court of Claims, it has given only lip 
service to the congressional directive to establish an 
investigation division. In the face of the Justice Department's 
policy against initiating settlement of claims, it has not 
actively encouraged the settlement of claims ... The Commission 
has chosen to sit as a court and, as a result the congressional 
mandate has been utterly frustrated. 
It is to be noted however, that in 1972 the Commission was still being 
criticised for showing little imagination in adopting procedures to 
reduce the time of litigation. 111 The suggestion was made for the 
Commission to cease to operate as a court and make administrative 
decisions based upon its own investigation. That proposal however was 
acknowledged as being flawed. Indians had repeatedly been compromised 
by Federal agencies in the past and were supposedly opposed to any 
type of system short of an adversarial process. Accordingly, the 
suggestion was made that the best compromise would be to introduce 
procedural improvemrnts requiring a greater inquisitorial input by the 
Commission itself. 1 2 Little was done to implement such reforms. 
When the Commission was finally dissolved in 1978 and its remaining 
caseload transferred to the Court of Claims, there were nearly 100 
outstanding unresolved matters although over 800 million dollars had 
been awarded by the Commission by this time. 
Concluding Assessment of the Indian Claims Commission 
The American Indian Claims Commission was on paper a not- dissimilar 
institution from the Waitangi Tribunal. The motivation however behind 
its establishment, the political setting in which it was established 
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and the mono- cultural type remedy provided resulted in the development 
of a typical court of a common law jurisdiction. A body which in 
practice can be contrasted with the Waitangi Tribunal. The "all or 
nothing", "win or lose" approach typical of a courtroom setting, 
proved to be an inappropriate means to resolve such issues. The 
Commission ultimately failed to "finalise" all historic Indian claims. 
That very objective was perhaps unrealistic if not impossible and has 
been acknowledged as such by the Waitangi Tribunal. 
The most justifiable reason given for persisting with the adversarial 
approach was the desire of the Indian to avoid reliance on Federal 
agencies preferring to present their own case least the merits of its 
claim not be as thoroughly researched or as fairly presented as it 
could be. Given the monocultural moti vation, mechanics and remedies 
of the Commission it would appear a justifiable fear. 
It may be that the Waitangi Tribunal's more effecti ve in vestigatory 
role and "hands on" approach is indicati ve of that body's greater 
cultural sensitivity and of the confidence the indigenous people have 
in its ability to research and decide Treaty issues. The Commission 
did not seem at any stage during its existence to enjoy such a sense 
of legitimacy in the eye of the American Indian. 
THE WAITANGI TRIBUNAL AND THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION : WHY THE 
CONTRASTS? 
Despite Congress' initial intent, the Indian Claims Commission 
developed into a court of law - a specialised but subordinate tier of 
the already existing Court of Claims. The Commission adopted an 
adversarial approach with all the trappings of a judicial setting. 
113 
Conversely the Waitangi Tribunal is clearly not a Court. 
The Tribunal is not a court. It is not an arbitral body. It 
has no power in its own right to determine or adjust the rights 
of subjects. Its function is confined to investigation and 
recommendation. However persuasive its research is, findings, 
and recommendations may be, they do not approach those of the 
character of a court, or a final judicial decision. 
tAW UBRARY 
\IICTO': ',\ 1 :. • '., Et1SITY OF V: '.:: L 11' GT0N 
1 
J 
J 
I 
J 
J 
J 
1 
1 
1 
l 
l 
44 
Successive New Zealand Governments have not been prepared to place the 
responsibility of final determination of Maori claims beyond its 
control. The inherent political character of the resolution of most 
claims would appear to limit the taking of such an option. The United 
States Congress however, felt able in 1946 to safely place into the 
hands of an independent body the task of ultimately disposing of such 
issues . The motivation of Congress was to establish a mechanism which 
would finalise all historical Indian claims - a process of putting 
ones "house in order". Of course the Waitangi Tribunal when first 
constituted was to deal with claims arising out of the Treaty of 
Waitangi post the enabling legislations enactment. Accordingly, one 
body was established to look back, the other if only initially, to 
look forward. That limitation on the latter body while harshly 
criticised as short - sighted at the time did if unintentionally 
acknowledge the currency of the issues with which it was to deal and 
removed any notion of a finite case- load for the Tribunal. 
The desire of the United States legislature was motivated out of a 
perceived need to assimilate Indian groups into the mainstream of 
American society. The existence of Indian claims and their protracted 
settlement was seen as a deterrent to Indian people from moving away 
from a tribal identity less they forego some financial windfall by 
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means o compensation or a ongstan ing istoric grievance. 
The existence of these claims is a serious impediment to 
progress. The Indians look forward to getting vast sums from 
these claims; thus the facts regarding their economic future are 
uncertain. They will hardly knuckle down to work while they 
still hope the Government will pay what they believe is due them. 
The efforts of the Government to make of the Indian a 
self- supporting and fully assimilated segment of our civi lisation 
can never hope for complete success so long as a considerable 
number of Indian tribes follow the very human and natural 
inclination to sit back and wait for the day of payment of the 
claims which will bring them riches. Adjudication of those 
claims by the Commission ... would once and for all cause the 
Indians to realise that their further progress will depend upon 
] 
] 
] 
J 
J 
J 
l 
J 
J 
I 
45 
their own efforts, for the claims which the Indians assert are in 
nearly all cases exaggerated in size and in many cases wholly 
without merit. 
In comparison, the creation of the Waitangi Tribunal marked an 
official turning away from such a policy of assimilation or notion of 
"one people". The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 was an acknowledgement 
of the resurgence of Maori as a separate entity and of tribal 
self-determination. Such concepts have continued to grow since 1975 
with the Tribunal's decisions emphasizing as a fundamental principle 
the Treaty's recognition of a partnership between two distinct 
peoples. 
The Alaskan settlement, previously referred to in this paper and other 
individual Federal settlements have been interpreted in the United 
States as a recognition by the Federal Government of the failure of 
the assimilation policy of the 1940's, and of a realisation that at 
least the more robust Indian tribes will retain their distinct 
identity. 
What is significant is that the proponents of the United States Indian 
Claims Commission hoped that by giving that agency a final decision 
making power, such issues would be permanently laid to rest. Yet that 
ability may have been the chief reason why the Commission despite 
deliberate legislative intent to the contrary fashioned itself as a 
court to fit neatly into the existing hierarchial structure of Federal 
Courts. 
The Commission's perception of itself as a court, meant that it 
refused throughout its existence to exercise the initiative. It was 
for the parties to present the issues and the evidence. The 
Commission remained aloof from any investigation into the merits or 
historical background of a particular claim despite all the 
administrative machinery made available to it to research such 
matters. Such adherence to both strict courtroom procedure and 
fastidious legal analysis of claims led J.T. Vance, a former Chairman 
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The US Indian Claims Commission has not functioned to any degree 
according to the broad plan of Congress. It has not functioned 
to the satisfaction of the Indians it was designed to aid as 
witnessed by the unresolved claims and present unrest. It has 
not been a solution; but rather, in the minds of many in Congress 
has become part of the problem. 
The Waitangi Tribunal has no power of final determination. It may 
recommend certain remedies but the ultimate decision has been left to 
government. Many will interpret that lack of power as a weakness, but 
in its role as a mechanism to promote the resolution of disputes 
between an indigenous people and central government, that very 
characteristic feature may allow it to avoid the difficulties which 
plagued the United States experience. Judge Durie has noted his 
belief that the Tribunal should not be empowered to make a final and 
binding determination given the political nature of most claims. 
Further he emphasizes the importance of avoiding the artificial 
constraints of fitting claims into strict legal parameters. It is the 
substance or merit of the issues which need to be analysed. The 
Tribunal should not be hampered in its endeavours by the need to 
constantly look over its shoulder to ensure adherence to judicial 
traditions. 116 
... perhaps because it is not a power of final decision, it is 
not so wedded to the normal rules of law that it cannot, subject 
to what a review court might say adapt its procedures to 
accommodate Maori claimants. 
The American experience was aggravated by the limited remedy that was 
made available to the Commission. Indian Tribes and groups were to be 
compensated for past injustices with money. This feature appears to 
have attracted little undue comment by American Commentators. The 
calculation of damages by the Commission invol ved allowance and 
deduction for federal monies "gratuitously" paid out by the Government 
in the past, although this was limited to claims based "upon fair and 
honourable dealings which were not recognised by any existing rule of 
law or equity". 
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This belief that historic grievances interpreted by many tribal 
claimants as the cause of their present economic and social 
difficulties could be neatly tidied up by one large grant of federal 
funds, illustrates an unrealistic appreciation of Indian aspirations. 
The Waitangi Tribunal's approach denotes a clear rejection of that 
"buying off" option. The rights of the Maori as encaptulated in the 
Treaty have been interpreted as belonging as much to future 
generations as to the present or the past. The United States 
presumption that a settlement can be reached on an absolute and final 
basis has been acknowledged as being unrealistic in the New Zealand 
setting. The Treaty of Waitangi as "a political or social contract 
between two people is something to be developed over time. It is not 
capable of a finite settlement at any particular stage in history".
117 
To that end, the Tribunal has concerned itself primarily with 
establishing and defining legitimate Treaty rights and principles and 
accumulating Treaty jurisprudence. Judge Durie has commented
118 
The Tribunal may point to a possible settlement with a regard to 
a particular grievance and with a particular tribe, but the 
Tribunal is not restricted to the pursuit of a specific 
settlement as a final and binding end to all its claims by any 
tribe. 
The Indian Claims Commission objecti ve was the direct opposite. The 
Commission restricted itself to the pursuit of a specific settlement 
as a final and binding end to that tribe's claims against the Federal 
Government. That ultimate resolution was limited by a very 
conservative and unrealistic monetary calculation in comparison to the 
consequences befallen the Indian tribe as a result of the injustice 
that had given rise to the claims. 
The best illustration of the expedient motive of the Federal 
Government to determine all Indian claims fore ver, and the unrealistic 
expectation of such an objecti ve, was the requirement that all claims 
be filed within five years. The Commission was gi ven another five 
years to 
complete 
adjudicate on the claims so filed; it's mission would thus be 
within ten years. Some 22 years later, after a number of 
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extensions of the Commission's life, it's unfinished caseload was 
transferred to the Court of Claims. 
The Waitangi Tribunal operates under no deadlines. It's workload has 
increased significantly in recent years. The legislature has 
responded by increasing its membership, and flexibility to sit in 
divisions in an effort to clear the rising backlog of cases. There is 
however no expectation by the Government, nor the Tribunal itself that 
it's work will result in the conclusion of all claims. Indeed the 
Tribunal with only recommentory powers can finalise nothing. There is 
no means of using the Tribunal as a mechanism from which Maori claims 
can be cleared for all time. Yet the ramifications of Tribunal 
findings and recommendations have highlighted potentially massive 
national concerns. Issues ranging from off- shore fisheries to the 
sale of state assets have their genesis in claims to the Waitangi 
Tribunal. Potential solutions to such claims are not limited to 
monetary compensation. Accordingly the appraisal of appropriate 
remedies for past injustices aggravated by the long non- action of the 
Crown is of concern not just to "litigants" but to various interested 
groups and to New Zealand society as a whole. 
Throughout the existence of the Indian Claims Commission the 
significance of any decision or award beyond the reaction of the 
Indian group involved was limited to the negligible impact on the 
Federal purse. There was little if any awakening by United States 
society to the injustices suffered by the indigenous Indian through 
the work of the Commission. It is submitted that all Congress did by 
empowering the Commission to arbitrate on Indian claims was to 
delegate the function of determining strictly valid "legal" claims by 
the Indians, and secondly quantifying that grievance with a monetary 
figure. The political and social element of the process was minimal. 
Despite the involvement of the federal government, the claims were 
hardly of even regional significance. 
Thus while the Tribunal has no final binding powers of decision 
making, the influence of its findings and recommendations have a more 
significant impact than the binding judgments of the Indian Claims 
Commission. The criticalness of the issues before the Tribunal are 
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such that properly the ultimate determination of such questions need 
to be made by the Government of the day. 
The Tribunal does not fit into any hierarchial structure, it stands 
quite apart from both the Courts and the other branches of Government. 
Apart from its susceptibility to judicial review, it operates 
independently from any appellant court. As has already been examined, 
the Tribunal as a specialist body with growing expertise will be used 
by the courts as an authorative resource upon which to draw, while the 
Government will increasingly find the pressure not to follow Tribunal 
recommendations difficult to resist. The latter more so when the 
Tribunal continues to provide practical working solutions to these 
vexed issues. While recognising legitimate Maori grievances over past 
injustices and the perpetuation of the consequences thereof in today's 
society, the Tribunal has sought a "practical application of Treaty 
principles" to various specific factual situations that have been 
brought to its attention. Accordingly, while the significance of the 
social and political consequences of Treaty issues with which the 
Tribunal must deal effectively deny any realistic suggestion of wide 
binding powers of decision making, the practical solutions embodied in 
its recommendations have been such that Government has had difficulty 
in resisting the Tribunal's proposals. This is especially so in the 
light of judicial endorsement of the "legal" and "factual" findings of 
the Tribunal. Had the Tribunal chosen to adopt the traditional 
adversarial approach exhibited in the Indian Claims Commission, the 
Tribunal's effectiveness would be severely limited. 
Despite similar administrative and procedural machinery being made 
available to the Commission it chose, despite the intent of Congress 
to sit as a court. It rejected the inquisitorial approach and 
perpetuated many of the problems experienced by claimants prior to the 
Commission's establishment. It did however have the power of making 
final binding decisions. Accordingly it perceived a need to interpret 
the issues argued before it by legal counsel in a strict legal 
context. The Commission ignored to a large degree the social 
character of many of the claims unless such an element could be 
incorporated in some legal right or obligation. The political 
element, intrinsically a part of the Tribunal's work in New Zealand 
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was an insignificant influence on the Commission at least throughout 
the 40's and 50's. The Commission was not required to have any regard 
to the "practical application" of its findings because the impact of 
any decision was so limited. 
The significance of that power of binding the federal government to a 
financial commitment was further diminished when the means of 
distributing awards is studied. Initially the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs distributed the funds without authority from Congress. The 
monies being transferred to a type of trust account administered by 
the Bureau to be made available for purposes agreed on by the Bureau 
and the tribes. In 1960 however, the distribution of funds came 
directly under the control of Congress with specific legislation being 
required setting forth the purposes for which the funds were to be 
used. Thus budgets, reports and plans were required to be submitted 
before legislative authority could be obtained. By 1973 this process 
was proving too bureaucratic and responsibility for such financial 
planning was re- delegated back to the Department of the Interior. 
This still required the Department of Indian Affairs to hold public 
hearings and submit a distribution plan to Congress detailing how the 
funds were to be spent. If within sixty days neither House of 
Congress rejected the plan, it would become effective without 
requiring further legislative approval. Accordingly, while the 
Commission had the power to set the level of compensation, the funds 
were required to be separately appropriated and were then subject to 
administrative and for a period legislative scrutiny before a plan of 
distribution was agreed to by Central Government. 
It may be that the Commission's adoption of the adversarial process to 
a large part was due to the lack of any perceived need to adopt 
innovative procedures. All the Commission was doing was extending the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. While the expansion of claims to 
ones based upon "fair and honourable dealings" was novel, the 
Commission had a court like function, namely to compensate parties who 
had sufficiently proved their cause of action. The social and 
political implications of such a process went no further than existing 
Federal policy. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Four distinct approaches for settling the claims of indigenous peoples 
b "d t"f" d 
119 
can e 1 en 1 1 e . 
Firstly, there is a pure judicial approach whereby legal entities 
can bring proceedings in a court of law for past injustices. While 
satisfactory when dealing with what Durie DCJ describes as justiciable 
claims clearly definable at law, the courts are less suitable in 
determining the non-justiciable questions relating to the sharing of 
political power and economic resources. In New Zealand the indigenous 
people are further limited in their use of the courts by the need for 
specific legislative reference to the Treaty and its principles. 
Notwithstanding the more liberal use of the Treaty of Waitangi as a 
means of statutory interpretation, that limitation remains a 
considerable barrier. Leaving aside however the legal complexities, 
it is apparent that a judicial response in an adversarial setting 
whereby each cl aim is reduced to an "all or nolhi ng", "win or lose" 
formula is not appropriate. The differences between the parties are 
accentuated and conflict promoted. This is further aggravated when 
dealing with what are often emotive issues; tension, necessarily 
racial is heightened. This is to be avoided. 
Secondly, there is the legislative process. An example of this is the 
Alaskan settlement in the United States whereby a negotiated agreement 
between the Alaskan Indian and the United States Federal Government 
resulted in specific legislation being passed Lo give effect to that 
contract. Such a solution presupposes that an ultimate or final 
resolution is possible. It also assumes that a just resolution will 
equate with political reality. That will not be the case if the 
process by which such a decision is made operates in a vacuum. Unless 
the indigenous people carry considerable political influence the 
success of such a legislative response it is submitted is dependent on 
the operation of one of the other three types of agencies referred to. 
Thirdly, there is the pure administrative approach exemplified in 
Canada with its Indian Claims Commissioner. An individual appointed 
outside Government and the Indian community to inquire into various 
issues in consultation with the indigenous people to promote a means 
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for settling certain tribal grievances. Via consultation, inquiry and 
recommendation as to appropriate means of adjudication, the 
Commissioner is empowered not to make settlements or even recommend 
settlements, but to promote the machinery or processes by which 
negotiation can be entered i,1to with the Government in relation to 
specific cases. The Commissioner acting as a mediator or middleman 
might preside over such negotiations in an attempt to promote common 
120 
ground and to encourage settlement. 
Fourthly, there is the special Tribunal or quasi administrative/ 
judicial approach. Clearly the Waitangi Tribunal is illustrative of 
that type of body, as was at least in theory the American Claims 
Commission. The Commission placing an onus on its judicial 
characteristic, the Tribunal perhaps on its administrative flavour. 
Of all these mechanisms each perhaps has its place in one form or 
another to deal with the type of grievances, both historic and current 
that have arisen between indigenous peoples and central government. 
The appropriateness of the device or combination of mechanisms chosen 
for settlement of the issue is crucial. If a solution is to be 
obtained in an efficient and effective manner, clearly the experience 
of that process will have an important bearing on the satisfaction 
which is obtained by the aggrieved party, if and when it obtains a 
remedy. "Settlements which have a lingering bad taste are not 
settlements at all and simply set the stage for future strife.
00121 
As mentioned previously in this paper such claims by indigenous 
peoples involve "polycentric" problems.
122 The process of settlement 
involves not just the resolution of a contractual dispute, nor the 
correction of past wrongs, it also involves the establishment of a 
reasonable basis for the future of a people. More so, when the 
concept of self-determination is being promoted. 
This paper has not attempted to determine the best approach to 
settling disputes between indigenous peoples and Governments however 
it is hoped that a more appropriate process has emerged via this 
examination of the Waitangi Tribunal and the American Claims 
Commission. Both forums have been classified in the fourth category 
of "special tribunal". The Commission adopted however a purely 
judicial approach. It ignored the political and social implications 
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of such claims that are inherently recognised in the second 
classification "the legislative process", and preferred to disregard 
any active participation in the promotion of itself as a means by 
which a negotiated settlement might be obtained, thereby avoiding any 
association with the type of process described in the third "Canadian 
type classification". As a result the United States experience with 
the Indian Claims Commission has not been viewed positively. 
The Waitangi Tribunal as stated is a quasi administrative/judicial 
body appropriately categorised in the fourth classification. It 
however either draws on or can be associated with any of the three 
other stipulated processes of resolving native people's grievances. 
It has chosen to regulate its proceedings in a semi - judicial manner 
and accumulate consistent Treaty jurisprudence. It has also however 
acknowledged the political character of its business in the practical 
recommendations that it has made to Government. Finally it has not 
denied itself the opportunity to promote constructive communication 
and encourage "settlement". Given the substantial ramifications of 
many Treaty issues on a small country like New Zealand the Tribunal 
has maintained the requisite flexibility to chart an appropriate 
course through the political, social and legal complexities of its 
task. It appears to have proved itself an apt mechanism to deal with 
the issues arising between the indigenous Maori people and the 
Government. 
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